Blog

Hurricane Sandy, October 2012: the record

What the city's after-action report and the National Hurricane Center recorded about October 29, 2012: 43 killed, a 14.06-foot storm tide, 59 recommendations.

The storm came ashore on a Monday. By the time Hurricane Sandy hit New York City on October 29, 2012, the city had been watching it for days, the mayor had ordered low-lying coastal areas evacuated, and the Emergency Operations Center had been open since Friday. None of that changed what the report written afterward called a ferocity unequalled by any coastal storm in modern memory.

Fourteen years later the record is still the best way to understand how the city thinks about water. This is that record: what the city's own after-action report says, what the National Hurricane Center measured and what the city changed because of it. The rest of the story is the guidance the city publishes today.

What the numbers say

Start with the ones that cannot be argued with. The city's after-action report, delivered in May 2013, opens its foreword with a flat sentence: forty-three New Yorkers lost their lives. It adds that tens of thousands more were injured, temporarily dislocated or entirely displaced by the storm's impact. The count of 43 is the city's own.

The second number is the water. The National Hurricane Center's report on the storm recorded a storm tide of 14.06 feet above mean lower low water at the Battery, at the southern tip of Manhattan. A storm tide is the total observed water level, combining the normal astronomical tide with the storm surge, and the Battery gauge is the reference point New Yorkers use for how high the harbor got. Fourteen feet of water above that baseline is a figure to hold in the mind's eye on a low street near the harbor.

A third number comes from the response: the report's authors made 59 recommendations, grouped into six core areas and a seventh section on ongoing recovery, after meetings with more than 115 city employees from more than 25 agencies.

The days before

The report is useful because it gives the sequence. The city's Coastal Storm Plan, whose present form dates to 2000, anticipates the series of decisions a mayor makes as a storm approaches. It was last significantly revised in 2007 and was adjusted after a review of Hurricane Irene in 2011.

As Sandy approached, executive-level briefings were convened daily at City Hall and at the Office of Emergency Management's headquarters in Brooklyn, with agency commissioners, the National Weather Service, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the state health department. These, along with worsening forecasts, led the office to activate the Emergency Operations Center on Friday, October 26. The mayor held the first of many daily press conferences the same day. The Logistics Center opened to supply responding agencies, the Healthcare Evacuation Center was activated to prepare for the possible evacuation of healthcare facilities, and the Emergency Supply Stockpile was activated to provision the shelter system.

The key decision was whether to order a mandatory evacuation. It came on the morning of October 28, following updated storm surge predictions from the National Weather Service. The order covered low-lying coastal areas in the five boroughs: what the plan then called Zone A. The report says plainly that the storm's reach exceeded the evacuated zones, and also that the Coastal Storm Plan saved lives and mitigated what could have been significantly greater injuries and damage.

What the water did, by neighborhood

The city's narrative is organized by function rather than by neighborhood, and it speaks of large-scale inundation and loss of power. Two parts of the geography stand out in the city's own guidance today.

The Rockaway peninsula, the long barrier strip at the end of the A train, sits between the Atlantic and Jamaica Bay, and the stations along the Rockaway line at Beach 25 St, Beach 36 St, Beach 44 St, Beach 60 St and Beach 67 St are a map of it. The neighborhood entry is The Rockaways. Coney Island, nearly three miles of beach in south Brooklyn, is the other exposed oceanfront; see Coney Island. The point is not to list damage, but to name the places where the city's evacuation zones make the most sense: along the oceanfront and the harbor.

The response: sanitation, water and the agencies in the middle

The after-action report names the work that nobody puts on a poster. It mentions "debris removal at the Department of Sanitation (DSNY) and dewatering at the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)" as examples of people whose everyday jobs are the storm's jobs. It also notes that thousands of city employees whose primary jobs do not include emergency management provided staffing and logistics support in temporary storm-related assignments. A photograph on the report's cover shows a Sanitation truck clearing debris.

After the storm, the mayor appointed senior staff members as borough recovery directors, one for each neighborhood hit hardest, to act as a single point of contact for residents and community groups. Dedicated teams of operations staff from across city agencies worked on generator placements, debris removal, shelter operations and food and water distribution. The report's table of contents tells the same story in outline: communications; general and healthcare facility evacuations; public safety, including 911 and power outages, generators and boilers; sheltering, including special medical needs shelters; response and recovery logistics; and community recovery services, among them food and water distribution, restoration centers and volunteer coordination. In its section on ongoing recovery, it lists a housing program, called Rapid Repairs, and a hotel program.

The 59 recommendations, in seven themes

The report groups its recommendations under seven themes, which read as a to-do list for the next storm:

  1. Improved evacuation, including updated evacuation zones and clearer communication so that New Yorkers understand how to protect themselves.
  2. Improved accessibility of all coastal-storm information and services to everyone, including people with disabilities or special medical needs, homebound people, non-English speakers and undocumented immigrants.
  3. Better integration of the city's data across platforms and agencies.
  4. Additional capacity to respond to large-scale building inundation and loss of power.
  5. Better coordination of relief to affected areas and vulnerable populations, including volunteers and donations.
  6. A mid- to long-term housing plan for New Yorkers displaced by damage from coastal storms.
  7. Partnership with federal and state authorities that regulate private companies.

Each of these has a line you can still trace in today's system. The first is the one most people experience: the city's evacuation zones today are numbered one through six, and NYC Emergency Management says the city may order evacuations starting with zone 1, depending on a storm's track, strength and projected surge. You can find your zone at maps.nyc.gov/hurricane or by calling 311. The second is visible in how alerts are sent: Notify NYC messages go out in languages such as Spanish, Chinese, Russian and Haitian Creole, and in American Sign Language. See hurricane evacuation zones 1 to 6 and Know your zone: hurricane evacuation Q&A.

The survey

One element of the report is easy to overlook and rewards attention. The city surveyed residents of Zone A, in English and Spanish, about their awareness of evacuation zones, how they received information about evacuation zones and severe weather, and their confidence in the city's guidance to evacuate or shelter in place. The survey was weighted by borough, age and other demographic factors to produce a representative sample. A survey of that kind is an acknowledgment that evacuation orders work only if people understand them and trust them.

That is a lesson about communication rather than about engineering. A city can have the best plan on paper, and the plan fails if a resident in a basement apartment in a low-lying neighborhood does not know that the letter on the map applies to him or her. The reforms that followed, including updated zones and clearer maps, were an attempt to close that gap.

What the city still tells people

Fourteen years on, the guidance NYC Emergency Management gives is plain. Coastal storms and hurricanes head a list of hazards that also includes flooding, extreme heat and winter weather. The city notes that FEMA flood zones are not evacuation zones, a distinction that confuses many residents. The Notify NYC service, which you can join by texting NOTIFYNYC to 692-692, is how many alerts reach people. See How Notify NYC alerts work and Emergency preparedness and Notify NYC.

Flooding, as NYC Emergency Management notes, accounts for more than $1 billion in property losses in the United States each year. A storm like Sandy is the extreme case of a pattern the city sees on a smaller scale in every heavy rain; the explainer on What flooding means in New York describes the watch and warning vocabulary.

Reading the record

A few lessons come out of the documents.

  • The measurement matters. The 14.06-foot storm tide at the Battery is the number most people cite, but it is a reading at one location. The after-action report is a reminder that damage depends on where you are, not just on the gauge.
  • The plan mattered, and it was incomplete. The report credits the Coastal Storm Plan with saving lives and also made 59 recommendations to improve it.
  • People are the system. The thousands of city employees outside emergency management who worked the storm are the reason the machinery ran at all.

For the agency that coordinates all of it, NYC Emergency Management is the profile. The report itself is on the city's website, and the National Hurricane Center's final report is on its own. Both are the best primary record of what happened on the night of October 29, 2012.

Related city government

Related guides

Related neighborhoods

Latest on this topic